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Improving neural networks sturdiness
through a data-augmentation generated by
adversarial attacks
Guim González Torregrosa
Resumen– El propósito de este artı́culo es analizar qué son los ataques adversarios a las redes neu-
ronales y si las redes pueden aprovechar estos ataques para obtener más datos de entrenamiento,
aumentando la precisión y robustez de sus predicciones ante futuros ataques. También veremos si
una entrada generada por un ataque a una red funciona en otras redes similares.
Para ello, se han generado más de 30 ataques adversarios y se probarán contra 3 arquitecturas de
red diferentes. Una de las redes se volverá a entrenar con estos ataques y finalmente se probará
para ver si estos ataques funcionan como aumento de datos y también si aumenta la robustez de la
red.
Lo que veremos es que un ataque generado en una red A no funciona en otra red B. Este ataque
confunde a la red B y la predicción obtenida es aleatoria pero no determinada. También veremos
que los ataques adversarios se pueden utilizar como estrategias de aumento de datos y que las
redes no se dejan engañar por el mismo tipo de ataques después de un paso de reentrenamiento.
El último experimento nos mostrará que no hay un aumento de tiempo significativo en la ejecución
de los ataques en una red reentrenada.
Palabras clave– redes neuronales, ataques adversarios, aumento de datos, deep learning,
clasificación de imágenes
Abstract– The purpose of this article is to analyze what adversarial attacks on neural networks are
and whether networks can take advantage of these attacks to obtain more training data, increasing
their predictions accuracy and robustness to future attacks. We will also found if one input generated
by an attack on one network works on other similar networks.
To do so, more than 30 adversarial attacks had been generated and will be tasted against 3 different
network architectures. On of the networks will be re trained with this attacks and finally tested to see
if this attacks work as data augmentation and also if the network sturdiness increases.
What we will see is that one attack generated on a network A does not work on some other network
B. This attack confuses network B and the prediction obtained is random but not determined. We will
also see that adversarial attacks can be used as data augmentation strategies and that the networks
are not fooled by the same kind of attacks after a re-train step. The last experiment will show us that
there is no significant time increase in the execution of the attacks on a re-trained network.




ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS show that many modernmachine learning algorithms can be broken in sur-prising ways. These failures of machine learning
demonstrate that even simple algorithms can behave very
differently from what their designers intend. The objectives
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of the article are:
1. Understand what adversarial attacks are.
2. Apply the attack on a real world problem.
3. See if the input generated by an attack works in similar
networks.
4. Use the generated attacks as data-augmentation for our
model.
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5. Try to increase the sturdiness of our model by re-
training it with the generated inputs.
6. Analyze the execution time before and after the re-
train step of a given network.
Both point 1 and 2 are well known to the artificial intelli-
gence community and there are numerous studies on them,
which are referenced during the article.
The innovation of this research is found in the other ones.
To see if an attack generated on one model can be used to
attack other similar models, either because they have been
trained with the same dataset or because they architecture
is the same. And to see if the inputs generated with the
attacks serve as data augmentation and later the execution
time of the attack will increase if our model has become
more robust.
2 STATE OF THE ART
Currently there are many studies that are being carried out
around adversarial attacks. Many of them intend to create
tools or stickers that we can use in real life to be able to fool
deep learning models.
One example would be glasses[7] with specific colors
that when wearing them, a neural network could mistake
our face for that of another person. This is a problem for
security systems such as facial recognition since we can im-
personate our victim.
Adversarial attacks are also applied to many fields such
as gaming[3], by adding small perturbations to the input of
the player agent, it can make the agent to miss-understand
the context and do the exact opposite of what it is supposed
to do. In the cited article there is an example of how an
adversarial attack applied on Pong, makes the agent to miss
the ball by going in the opposite direction.
It has also been proved the effectiveness of the attacks in
printed format. The attack still works if you print the image
generated, take a photo of the printing and classify it again
with the same network. Imagine doing this technique with
traffic signs (the dataset we use in this article), then printing
the result and paste it in a real traffic sign. This will totally
change the behaviour of self-driving cars.
There are studies in attack defenses[6] with different
techniques such as modifying the data to simulate this per-
turbation in the original dataset, hiding the gradient and
some other information about the model, or adding another
class to the model as NULL and train the class with altered
images.
This is not the case of this article. We do not intend to
screw self-driving cars AI systems. Also we do not want to
focus on new types of attacks. What we want to see is how
we can take advantage of them and how they interact with
other deep learning models.
3 TECHNOLOGIES USED
The project is hosted in Google Drive and it makes use of
the Google Colab computing power. Since all the project is
based on deep learning models the need for a powerful GPU
is a must. Although adversarial attacks are not high-cost al-
gorithms in terms of computational resources, in some cases
the attacks have collapsed the RAM of the computer and the
GPU provided by Google Colab’s free plan. This is why it
is recommended to replicate this project on a personal PC if
you don’t have a payment plan in cloud services.
The entire project has been developed with Python and
the Tensorflow and Keras libraries for the creation of the
models, the training process and the execution of the at-
tacks. In the appendix section there is a link to the repos-
itory with the source code, the inputs generated and some
analysis.
4 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
As described on the OpenAI blog[1]: “Adversarial attacks
are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has
intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mis-
take; they’re like optical illusions for machines”. This at-
tacks are also hard to defend against because they require
machine learning models to produce good outputs for every
possible input. Most of the time, machine learning models
work very well but only work on a very small amount of all
the many possible inputs they might encounter.
In this section we will demonstrate what an adversarial
attack is and how it is done. To do so, we will take the
example from Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Ex-
amples[2] as a reference.
In the article cited before, it uses an image of a panda
along with a small perturbation. The result of this mix
confuses the model and the output is something else com-
pletely different from what we would expect, a gibbon in
this case. In order not to copy the example, we will trick the
model with a lemon and we will fool the image recognition
model InceptionV3 from Google. InceptionV3 is a widely-
used image recognition model that has been shown to attain
greater than 78.1% accuracy on the ImageNet dataset.
To prepare our input image to match the shape of the in-
put layer of the network, we have to resize it, normalize it,
and add a fourth dimension. The resize will be of 299 pixels
height and 299 pixels width. The normalization will be in
range of [-1,1]. The fourht dimension we need to add is the
batch size of the inputs. Since we are dealing with just one
image our batch size will be 1. With all this, we will have
an input shape of [1, 299, 299, 3].
Once the input image is prepared we can begin the at-
tack algorithm. Here is the result of our generated attack,
converting a giant panda into a lemon, imperceptible to the
human eye.
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Fig. 1: Example of an adversarial attack generation applied
to InceptionV3 on ImageNet. By adding a small perturba-
tion equal to the gradient of the cost function with respect to
the input, we can trick the model’s classification of the im-
age. In this examples and the ones ahead, the perturbation
applied will be of 0.01 (all images are normalized between
[-1,1] before entering the network).
Let x be our input image (the panda), p the maximum
perturbation we accept in the input, we can define pMax
and pMin being the maximum and minimum changes we
can perform in the input image.
x = image (1)
pMin = x− p (2)
pMax = x+ p (3)
Since we want to convert our panda into a lemon, first
we have to define our optimization process. We need to
maximize the probability of obtaining the target class, so
we will create a cost function equal to the last layer of the
network with the target class as the result.
loss = output layer[0, target class] (4)
This loss function will return us a vector of all the proba-
bilities for each class. Each probability will be 0 except the
target class position (the ideal result of the network for this
class).
Once we have our loss function defined, we need to create
our gradient. When we create a neural network, we want to
find the gradient between the error and the parameters, this
will tell us what values we need to change in our parameters
to slowly minimize the error. But in this case we will use
the gradient not on the parameters but on the input variable,
the input layer (with the image tensor in it). Using the Keras
function gradients we can obtain the graph of the gradients.
gradient, cost = K.gradients(loss, input layer) (5)
In this gradient variable we have a tensor that tells us
which values we need to change in the input layer tensor in
order to optimize our loss function. In the cost variable we
have the cost associated to this gradient step. Adding the
gradient to the image and clipping the result between the
values pMin and pMax we can modify our input inside
the boundaries defined and change the output a little bit.
x = x+ gradient (6)
x = clip(x, pMin, pMax) (7)
This is just one iteration of the process. The changes pro-
duced by the gradient will be very small. What we have to
do is to put this process inside a loop and make a stop con-
dition based on the function cost. The cost will define how
much confidence the network will have on your generated
attack. In all examples in this article, the algorithm iterates
until it reaches a cost of 0.95.
With the past attack we can observe several things:
• The attack does not need to know what architecture or
what is the configurations of the weights of the net-
work on which it is applied. Just by having access to
the model and seeing what output generates for each
input, the attack minimizes the perturbation in the in-
put trying to maximize the changes in the output.
• By specifying the maximum cost of the attack algo-
rithm, we can make the network more secure from our
fake input than from the original one. In the example
we see that the network ensures with 95.9% security
that it is a panda, while after the attack it ensures with
99.8% security that it is a lemon.
• Knowing the classes that the model can recognize, we
can generate new inputs that show the output that we
want. To demonstrate this, below is a table with the
same image of the panda applied to different attacks
that generate different fake inputs chosen by the user.
TABLE 1: PREDICTIONS GENERATED BY INCEPTIONV3
Prediction Confidence Attack time (s)
Giant panda 95.9% -
Lemon 99.8% 450
Great white shark 99.9% 420
Llama 99.6% 345
Beer glass 99.9% 255
Examples of adversarial attacks generations applied to InceptionV3 on Im-
ageNet. Different perturbations had been calculated and applied to the
same input, obtaining different outputs of our choice. The only thing that
changes is the targets vector provided to the algorithm in order to calculate
the perturbation.
5 WORK SETUP
To add meaning to the article, instead of transforming ani-
mals into lemons, we will work with traffic signs. We will
carry out adversary attacks focused on a real problem with
self-driving cars. Imagine one of these attacks in real life,
transforming a ”Stop” sign into a ”Speed limit (120km / h)”
sign. Here we do have bigger consequences.
5.1 Dataset
For this scenario we will use the German Traffic Sign
Recognition Benchmark[4] dataset. The GTSB is a single-
image, multi-class classification problem with more than
50.000 images divided in 43 classes. Here is an example
of the first 20 classes in the dataset.
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Fig. 2: Example of all the 43 classes in the GTSB dataset.
Classes are sorted left to right and top to bottom, so ”Speed
Limit (20km/h)” is class 0, ”Speed Limit (30km/h)” is class
1, and so on so forth.
One first challenge encountered with the dataset is that
the dataset itself is not symmetric. For example, for class 0
we have 210 images and for class 2 we have 2.250. There-
fore we can not train our model with all the images, since
class 2 will have more influence in the weights configura-
tion of the network than class 0. Here is a histogram of the
number of images per class.
Fig. 3: Histogram showing the number of images for each
class. The class with more images is number 2 with a total
of 2.250 and the class with less images is number 0 with a
total of 210.
To solve this, the models created during the project have
been trained with 30 images of each class. They may seem
few but as you will see in the training results we had enough
with 30 images per class. This images have been selected
randomly so as not to influence training.
5.2 Models
As explained at the beginning of the article, one of the ob-
jectives of the investigation is to see if an attack generated in
one model has the same effect applied to a different model.
To do this, we need to create and train different models with
the use of Tensorflow and Keras.
All the models are Convolutional Neural Networks[5]
with different architectures. Model number 1 will be used
to generate all the attacks and will also be used for the re-
train step (experiments 2 and 3). Models number 2 and 3
will be used to see if the attacks generated with number 1
also work on similar models (experiment 1).
The 3 networks are have been trained with the same
dataset, the same images, badge size, test and train parti-
tions, etc. The only difference are changes in the architec-
ture of each one. All the code for the models is available at:
https : //github.com/GuimGonzalez/adversarial −
attacks− data− agumentation.
Network architectures
Let C be a 2D Convolutional layer with ReLU activation
and k filters, F be a Flatten layer and D a Dense layer with
size j, the architectures of the three neural networks are:
Network 1: C64− C64− F −D256−D43
Network 2: C64− C32− C16− F −D256−D43
Network 3: C32− C16− C64− F −D256−D43
All the networks have a dropout of 0.5 between the two
dense layers and they all use the Adam optimizer and the
categorical crossentropy loss function.
The parameter used to save the model is the loss, every
time the loss of one epoch is smaller than the previous one, a
copy of the model is saved in Google Drive. As it is shown
in the following chart, all the networks have acquired an
accuracy of 99% and a loss of 0.01 (the charts are almost
identical in the 3 networks so only network 1 training his-
tory is shown).
Fig. 4: Training history of network 1, showing charts of
accuracy and loss during the training process. Note that the
accuracy drop at the end is not significant since the model
is only saved if some improvement is made in the loss.
The 3 networks have been trained with 30 images and the
selection of them has been done randomly. The high accu-
racy achieved with only 30 images is due to the resizing to
higher image resolution, the ”easy” classification of traffic
signs and the simplicity of the network.
5.3 Generation of attacks
Following the same steps explained before in the adversar-
ial attack example of the panda, now we will do the same
with our dataset. Here is an example of how a ”Speed
Limit (30km/h)” sign is converted into a ”Speed Limit
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(120km/h)”. This is a big thread in real life, imagine be-
ing at the inside of your Tesla in auto pilot mode.
Fig. 5: Comparison of the original input and the input gen-
erated with an adversarial attack applied to our network.
The human eye cannot see the differences between the two
images since there is a maximum perturbation of 3 values
per pixel.
Most of the images in the GTSB dataset have a size of
30 × 30 pixels (height per width). This means that every
image has 30× 30× 3 parameters, which is equal to 2700.
With this amount of parameters the algorithm does not have
enough freedom and most of the times it ends in an infinite
loop. To solve this, there is a resizing process after every
image is loaded, converting our initial 30× 30 image into a
250× 250 with 187500 parameters.
With this amount of parameters to play with, we see that
even with a Grad-Cam[8] visual explanation of the attack
there are not visual differences of what parts of the image
are more important to the model in order to classify it cor-
rectly.
Fig. 6: Class activation visualization of the original image
and the attack image using the Grad-Cam algorithm.
6 EXPERIMENT 1: RELIABILITY
This experiment will test the reliability of the attacks. We
want to see if an attack generated on a network A has the
same impact on a network B. To do this, we have generated
34 attacks on network 1. If we test this attacks on network
2 and 3, we have a total of 68 tests, enough to see what hap-
pens with this first experiment. We can expect 3 different
scenarios:
1. The attack failed, the network predicted the sign cor-
rectly.
2. The attack worked, the prediction is the same as the
attack.
3. Network confused, the attack did not work but the pre-
diction is something random.
After testing the 68 possibilities, we have obtained the
following results:
Fig. 7: Histogram showing how many attacks applied to
other deep learning models had worked, confused the net-
work or did not work.
What this histogram is showing us is that in fact, an
adversarial attack generated on one network still confuses
similar networks. But, if we want to get a specific result,
we can not rely on the attack. If we do not mind what the
result is, we are mostly sure the attack will change the out-
put of the network.
7 EXPERIMENT 2: DATA AUGMENTATION
AND STURDINESS
This experiment will demonstrate if we can use generated
attacks as new data for our model in subsequent training cy-
cles. As we do not want to influence the training in any way,
we will use attacks generated on the same type of signal,
only one. If we used all the attacks that we have generated
with different signals, we could make the network more ro-
bust with that type of signal than another.
Since we have 25 different generated attacks on ”Speed
limit (30km/h)” signal, we will use this images for our ex-
periment. The first step is to split this images into train and
test. We will use 20 images for the training step and 5 im-
ages for the test step. The images will be picked randomly
to not influence the process. Once we have this two sets,
it is time to train the network (we use network 1 generated
previously) with the new images. Here is accuracy and loss
history of the training phase.
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Fig. 8: Accuracy and Loss history of the retrain step, us-
ing generated attacks as inputs and specifying the desired
output that we expect.
It is normal to see the accuracy starting at 0 and the loss
starting at 6 even if the network was previously trained.
This doesn’t mean it is not working, in fact, this is what
we should expect. Remember our goal with the attacks was
to fool the machine, and to change the input image until
we did not get our desired output. Since we are telling the
network that this is now a completely different output, the
accuracy falls to 0. It is like a child when learning some-
thing new from scratch.
Now that the network has been re-trained, we can test the
rest of the attacks and see if the model is more robust or not.
We can expect 3 different scenarios:
1. The attack worked, the prediction is the same output
the attack generated.
2. Network confused, the attack did not work but the pre-
diction is something random.
3. The attack failed, the network predicted the ”Speed
limit (30km/h)” signal.
After classifying the other images with the re-trained
model, the rest of the attacks had totally failed. The net-
work has learned with the previous attacks and now it is ca-
pable of predicting the ”Speed limit (30km/h)” signal again
without being fooled. Due to the lack of time, the number
of tests are not as high as I would like, and therefore it re-
quires more investigation on it. But for now, we can say two
things:
• The network sturdiness has augmented. The attacks
that once fooled the model, can not anymore. This
means that we can make neural networks like the ones
from Tesla self-driving models to increase their sturdi-
ness against real attacks.
• Since they don’t confuse the network anymore, this is
an alternative way to generate a data augmentation set
of images. We can create more images based on gen-
erated attacks, and another good thing is that we can
generate as many as we want (with different perturba-
tions). This gives us more possibilities when working
with small datasets.
This are the parameters used for the retraining step:
• Epochs: 5
• Batch size: 10
• Validation data: same as training data
In this step we used the training data as validation data
too. This is a bad practice in most cases since we over-
fit the network. But in this case it is exactly what we are
trying to do, our need is to ”fix” the network and change
this predictions even using brute force.
8 EXPERIMENT 3: ATTACK EXECUTION
TIME
With this last experiment we want to see if the execution
time of an adversarial attack increases after re-training our
model with these adversarial attacks. The steps we will fol-
low to do this are these:
1. Take all the images used to re-train the model, 20 in
total. This are the ones we want want to repeat since
the network the weights of the network have been re-
configured with this images as the input.
2. Take the original images of the attacks we have se-
lected. Remember we want to repeat the attack with
the same conditions, except for the re-trained model.
This means our input will be the original image, not
the one generated from the attack. Since we have gen-
erated 3 attacks for every original image, we have 7
images to do the attack.
3. Repeat the attack on the re-trained model with this 7
images and compare the execution times with the old
ones. For every image we can generate 3 attacks, the
same ones as before.
After doing all this steps and repeating the 20 attacks,
60% of them have increased the execution time and 40% of
them have reduced the execution time.
Taking into account the small number of images with
which the experiment has been carried out, we can say that
after the re-train step even if the network sturdiness has im-
proved and it is not fooled anymore by the same attacks, the
execution time still remains random. There is no enough ev-
idence to say that the execution time has increased since we
do not have a significant differences in the repeated attack
times.
This result was to be expected since, as we have seen
before with the Grad-Cam, the network does not look at a
different part of the image. This perturbation is so small
and so random that it is not about a fixed part of the image
but some exact values which need to be found.
In fact, if we analyze an attack history chart, we can
see that the cost does not increase until the algorithm finds
which pixels have to be altered.
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Fig. 9: History showing the cost of an adversarial attack. It
shows how most of the time spent in an adversarial attack is
in finding the exact pixels it has to alter in order to get the
desired output.
Most of the time of an adversarial attack algorithm is
spent in finding this values. Once this threshold is passed
and the algorithm fins them and sees that the gradient starts
to change with a higher frequency, it only takes a few steps
to generate the result image.
9 CONCLUSIONS
The general purpose of this article was to analyze adversar-
ial attacks and see what benefits we can obtain from them,
such as data-augmentation or an increase in the robustness
of the network. On top of that, we have been able to obtain
observations from several different experiments. We have
seen that:
• Adversarial attacks do not need to know what architec-
ture of the network on which they are being executed.
They treat the network as a black-box only knowing
the input shape and the desired output. This is a threat
to all available models in the Internet.
• By specifying the maximum cost of the attack algo-
rithm, we can make the network more secure from our
fake input than from the original one. The cost of the
attack is the confidence threshold of our output.
• The size of the input data affects directly to the attack
execution time. If the input is small, the attack does not
have enough parameters to alter inside the perturbation
defined and the execution never ends. Otherwise, if the
input is so big, the attack spends so much time trying
to find which are the correct values to change in order
to get the desired output. In our case with the 250 ×
250 × 3 images we have gotten execution times from
0 seconds to 5 minutes.
• Adversarial attack generated on one network still con-
fuses similar networks. If we want to get an specific
output from a network, we have to apply the attack to
that specific network. But if we just want to confuse
the network, an adversarial attack generated on a sim-
ilar network might confuse this second one. This re-
sults are not 100% exact so it is better to generate the
attack always on the target network.
• It is possible to increase the network sturdiness to fu-
ture attacks by re-training it with fake inputs. This
leads us to new data-augmentation strategies. Since
the network is not fooled anymore, we can use this in-
puts as new training data.
• Last, we have seen that most of the time of an adver-
sarial attack algorithm is spent in finding which values
have to be changed. This process with the gradient
has a random component and so the attack execution
time does not directly depend on the network sturdi-
ness. This conclusion needs further investigation as it
has not been done with the desired amount of data.
Adversarial attacks are hard to defend against because
it is difficult to construct a theoretical model of the attack
crafting process. Therefore, while there are many studies
being carried in the defense against this kind of attacks, I
encourage researchers to also study beneficial cases of hav-
ing a way to generate new data for the machine, even if it
looks the same to the human eye.
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Grad-Cam class activation visualization
